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Introduction
Human beings are future oriented animals. We find ourselves in the midst of the
world, and we strive to change it. Whether we are the private possessors of an intuitive, personal
dissatisfaction and seek to change only ourselves, or we publicly speak an explicit desire to
change our common surroundings to better achieve our shared desires, we make plans to change
the present in order to arrive at a more satisfactory future. Plans are necessarily decisions, and
decisions once acted upon, have consequences. Because human faculties are limited, we are
unable to see all the consequences of our decisions and actions as their repercussions stream out
into the future. And because we are future oriented, we are concerned with consequences. How
then, to ameliorate the unforeseen consequences of our plans, decisions and actions? This
question I believe, frames the singular essence of the many problems that the profession of
planning struggles with.  This paper will examine the dominant method of coping with this
question, the method that is called the rational planning model. Specifically, it will address how
this model has been applied to federal forestry planning.
This examination is presented in three parts. The first section offers a description and
general overview of the rational planning model and a discussion of the criticisms that its
approach has stimulated. The second section discusses the model’s application to forestry
planning as codified in the National Forest Management Act and the administrative rules that
direct their implementation. Consequences of the application of the model to forestry issues are
discussed in the context of the events that led to the shutdown of logging on federal lands in the
Pacific Northwest. This section also introduces the 1999 Committee of Scientists Report that
recommended changes in the planning rules for the National Forests. Versions of these
recommendations were adopted in November 2000 as final governing rules. The third section
introduces the concept of ‘planning for ambivalence’ and examines some of the Committee’s
recommendations in light of the uncertainties inherent in making forestry plans. The question of
whether the rational model can withstand ambivalence is addressed in the context of adaptive
management, or plan making as experimental action.
The Rational Planning Model
Overview
Prior to understanding the rational model, I first want to examine what it is that
planners have come to identify as rational. John Friedmann describes three concepts of
rationality that have informed planning: (1) Market rationality, which he describes as being
grounded in a metaphysics of possessive individualism and which predicates the individual as
existing prior to society. Society then becomes the mechanism that enables individuals to pursue
their private interests. This prior-to status gives market rationally a quasi-natural character, and
ranks it as being beyond human intention, thereby making its assumptions unavoidably
compelling. From this perspective, reason is the means toward the maximization of private
satisfactions. (2) Social rationality makes the opposite assumption, that the social group grants
the individual her identity through membership in the group. Reason becomes the tool of the
collective interest and functions as the avenue toward communal satisfactions. (3) The third form
The Rational Planning Model in Light of 2
of rationality is a hybrid of the preceding two and seeks some middle ground between them.
Friedmann identifies it with the realization on the part of capital that some state sponsored
restraint was necessary to curtail the excesses of market rationality and provide for the public
good. Friedmann calls this type of rationality social or modern planning. It is explicitly
concerned with social outcomes (Friedmann 1987 pp. 19-22)
In this description rationality is not something which grants us an objective view of
the world. Rational mechanisms, such as the logical inferences embedded in the grammar of our
languages imply that this is the case, but the distinctions that Friedmann makes allows us to see
rationality as a mode of social discourse that creates it own self-fulfilling processes according to
the uses to which it is put. Modern social planning, as a mediator between market and social
rationality, exists in the tension between different criteria of what is fundamentally rational.
Yet we seldom think of rationality as having anything other than its own criteria of
logical processes to support itself. Rather we think that rationality, or the process of being
rational is equal to the act of knowledge, or knowing that we know something is true. In this
sense, rationally derived knowledge is given a special status as the source of certainty and truth.
Other types of knowledge - intuitive, imaginative, or emotional are given a lesser status and set
in opposition to the idea that rational knowledge is the sole repository of truth (Darke 1985).
This privileging of rational knowledge over other forms has its origins in the scientific
and philosophic revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries, and in the social revolutions of the
Enlightenment which gave public form to these scientific worldviews. What essentially was
overturned in this shift to the modern sensibility was the ancient concept of meaning.
What made the rise of modern science and the modern sensibility possible was the
shattering of the millennium old concordance between religion and philosophy concerning the
final ends to which humanity and nature were alike destined. The roots of western civilization,
Greek philosophy and revealed religion, were in agreement regarding the fundamental status of
final causality as an integral dimension of the true and the real. The world of nature, whose telos,
or ends, reason was able to grasp, was amenable to the purposes of a benevolent and reasonable
creator. The common teleological status of humanity and nature, their shared notion of purpose,
was the link that made religion a science and science a religion. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)
speaks for the modern sensibility when he pronounces the end of this agreement in the appendix
to Part I of his Ethics (published posthumously in 1677):  “Nature has no fixed goal and all final
causes are but figments of the human imagination” (Spinoza 1992 p. 59). This pronouncement
was a public realization that the complementary telos of nature and humanity that had formerly
granted value and meaning to the vicissitudes of life was breaking down. Now, if knowledge or
science were to advance, then it would have no use for purposes or goals. Knowledge,
understood as scientifically verifiable truth predicated on empirical evidence and quantifiable
data, no longer had any need to ponder the whys and wherefores of life because the questions no
longer existed. Questions of value and meaning were eliminated from what came to be
considered true knowledge (Cohen 1995).
The profession of modern practical planning is not overly concerned with these
issues, nor should it be. My purpose in this opening section is to identify what it is that planners
have come to identify as rational and so come to an understanding of what the rational model as
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a planning model implies.  As heirs of this legacy, we act under the Enlightenment assumption
that the world is objectively knowable through the instruments of empirical science. This
knowledge of the truth of the world that emerges from scientific inquiries is validated by
becoming the basis for our technical mastery over nature. A second assumption is that the world
of human affairs is as amenable to this verifiable methodology as are the natural sciences. The
emphasis on technical mastery further elevates verifiable empirical knowledge to the status of
true knowledge as being the action of manipulation. In contrast, other types of knowledge are
seen as merely personal and appreciative. Emotional, intuitive and imaginative knowledge as
appreciative knowledge are still valid ways of knowing the world, but are reduced to the purely
private sphere (Friedmann 1987 p.41-42).
The three types of rationality that Friedman describes as structuring modern planning
are basically united on their reliance upon the methodology of empirical scientific investigation
(Klosterman 1978; Alexander 1984; Formaini 1990). Robert A. Beauregard has described all
three forms of Friedmann’s rationality in what he calls the modernist project of planning as
follows:
The initial thrusts of the modernist project of planning were to diminish the excesses
of industrial capitalism while mediating the intramural frictions among capitalists that
had resulted in a city inefficiently organized for production and reproduction…In the
modernist planning project, reality that can be controlled and perfected is assumed.
The world is viewed as malleable because its internal logic can be uncovered and
subsequently manipulated…The modernist project is derived from beliefs about
knowledge and society and is inextricably linked to the rise of capitalism, the
formation of the middle class, the emergence of a scientific mode of legitimation,
the concept of an orderly and spatially integrated city that meets the needs of society,
and the fostering of the interventionist state. Technical rationality is viewed as
a valid and superior means of making public decisions, and information gathered
scientifically is regarded as enlightening, captivating and convincing…Such beliefs
repeat and mimic beliefs about enlightenment which are associated with the rise of
capitalist democracies and with the modernist quest for control and liberation
(Beauregard, 1989 p. 384 & 386).
Beauregard’s modernist project of planning is essentially the rational planning model
in its ideological framework. Friedmann identifies the rational planning model as the operative
mode of inquiry in what he calls the policy analysis strand of conservative forms of societal
guidance planning (Friedmann 1987 p. 76). In a standard policy analysis textbook, the methods
of this model are presented as the Classical Rational Problem Solving Process (Patton & Sawicki
1993). Elsewhere it is called the Rational Comprehensive Method (Harper & Stein 1995;
Weaver, Jessop & Das 1985). It has been identified as the ruling or normal paradigm that
governs the practice of modern planning (Alexander 1984; Hemmens 1980). Although it has a
myriad of names, it has a singular approach to problem solving. This approach demands the
systematic evaluation of alternative means toward a preferred goal. Once a goal has been
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selected, the prevailing assumption is that there are only certain correct ways of achieving it. The
number of basic steps in the process vary as to its description by different writers but they can be
summed up as follows:
1. Verifying, defining & detailing the problem (problem definition, goal definition,
information gathering)
2. Establishing evaluative criteria (measurements to determine success and failure of
alternatives)
3. Identifying alternatives to achieve goals
4. Evaluating alternative policies
5. Implementing the preferred alternative
6. Monitoring and evaluating outcomes and results
What one must keep in mind in evaluating this common sense approach to problem
solving and plan making are the assumptions that underpin it. It is in the exportation of the model
into the social world of practice that the assumptions prove problematic.
Critiques of the Rational Model
The vision of reality that Beauregard calls the internal logic of the world that can be
manipulated by planners or scientists is a reality that presumes a certain theory of how
perception works. In this vision of reality, our minds are mirrors of the world and the symbols
that we use to communicate correspond to the reality that they name. Rational thought consists of
the manipulation of abstract symbols and these symbols get their meaning via a correspondence
with the world objectively construed, that is, independent of whatever understanding an entity
beings to it. From this perspective, we are able to achieve that disembodied bird’s eye view
essential to solving problems on this basis.
The problems with this approach is that the most of the problems that planning
struggles with cannot be solved on this basis because they do not exist in the isolated world of
the laboratory. They are often the ‘wicked problems’ that do not lend themselves to solutions by
technical means (Rittel & Webber 1973). In a 1984 paper entitled After Rationality, What?
Ernest Alexander cites an encyclopedic array of attacks on the rational planning model. These
criticisms are based on both philosophic and practical considerations. They range from
descriptions of the impossibility of satisfying the demands of exhaustive alternative evaluations
and complete information requirements, to research that indicates that actual decision making
processes in organizations follow a more incremental as opposed to comprehensive approach.
The actual political context of planning situations calls into question the singular role of planner
as rational technician at the expense of other roles such as advisor, mediator, or administrator.
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Similarly, the organizations where planning takes place can not be considered isolated from the
social context that helps construct understanding (Sarewitz 1996; Formani 1990; Jasanoff 1990).
The nature of supposedly value-free evaluative criteria has been shown to be dependent on the
choices that the scientist  or researcher brings to their formation and cannot be understood in
isolation from the field of beliefs in which they originate. Scientific claims to empirical
underpinning of quantifiable knowledge rely upon a certain pragmatic understanding about what
is more efficacious as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience
(Quine 1953).
In the context of these criticisms Friedmann’s analysis of the necessity of planners to
understand his three kinds of rationality appears to be vindicated. What one considers rational is
dependent upon the perspective that one is operating in. Market and social rationality, along with
social planning are all rational within the confines of their assumptions. Establishing these
assumption is a process that is purely political, that is, open to debate.
The Rational Model as Applied to Forest Planning
In a recent book James C. Scott explores how the simplification of knowledge is
necessary for understanding and acting in a world of complex interrelated realities. He describes
the invention of modern forestry practices in 18th century Prussia and Saxony as an example of
how the abstractions of analysis and calculation, when imposed upon a natural system can have
both incredible success and unforeseen failures.
The Prussian forester that Scott describes is working from within the focused
perspective of forest as a revenue production instrument. With this goal in mind, data collection
led to the model of a standardized tree to calculate the volume of salable wood. This
standardized tree became the future vision of what the forest could be, and the process of
transforming the natural forest into a uniform group of standardized trees promised the forester a
more rational, orderly and aesthetically pleasing system to manage. Scott notes that “the forest
itself would not even have to be seen; it could be ‘read’ accurately from the tables and maps in
the foresters office” (Scott, 1998 p. 15).
The consequences from this approach led to both successes and failures. Productivity
increased for the first harvest rotation, but the second-generation plantings showed substantial
regression in the loss of timber volume. Ecological processes that had been considered
subordinate to the goal of producing timber volume were found to have effects that were
essential to the achievement of the forester’s goal. This is the main point of Scott’s illustration:
the simplification or sharpening of focus that bracketed out elements of the forest system that did
not explicitly pertain to the goal of maximizing the single element of the forest as instrumental or
economic value ultimately prevented that value from being realized (Scott, 1998 pp. 11-22).
Scott uses this story as a metaphorical introduction to his review of how this process works on a
large scale for state sponsored programs. For my purposes, it serves as a literal example and
introduction to the consequences of applying the rational planning model to U.S. Forestry
practices.
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Historical Overview
The Creative Act of 1891 authorized the President to withdraw forested lands from the
public domain and create forest reserves. Regulations for the use of these lands did not take
effect until 1897 when Congress passed the Organic Administration Act, which stated that forest
lands were to provide “a continuous supply of timber [for the] use and necessities of the nation”
(Elliot J. 1984). The German scientific forestry model that viewed the forest as a single
economic commodity that Scott illustrates was by this time the standard model worldwide and
was the paradigm for U.S. forestry as forestry for timber production (Scott 1998, p. 19). The
Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944 was the first national legislative action
regarding specific forestry practices. This legislation linked community stability to industry
stability and consequently interpreted sustained yield or harvest practices as assuring a stable
economic base to timber communities. This species of rational planning illustrates the attempt to
combine market rationality with social rationality by mandating some provision for the public
good. The Sustained Yield Act linked timber production to particular social outcomes, i.e. the
economic well being of timber dependent communities in terms of job opportunities. As market
pressures increased after World War II, federal timber became a highly sought after commodity
in the post-war industrial boom as industry reliance on federal timber accelerated (Bucholz
1993). This increased demand consequently served three purposes well, increased revenues to
the government, to private industry and to timber communities. This time period can be seen as
analogous to the short run benefits that the forest as industrial commodity offered to the original
German planners. Remember, salable wood volume increased dramatically for the first
generation of the new industrial forest.
As market demands outpaced planning efforts, the Forest Service attempted to
alleviate eventual problems by developing land use plans. The content of these plans were
developed locally under regional guidance and was not tied to any national planning or
budgeting process (Wilkerson and Anderson 1987).  
Congress recognized public concern regarding problems of competing forest uses by
codifying in the Multiple–Use-Sustained-Yield-Act of 1960 (MUSYA), additional purposes
other than timber production for managing national forests. In effect, this was the first official
attempt to enlarge the focus from the forest as commodity to the forest as including less
measurable attributes. This Act required the agency to give “due consideration” to various
resources when managing forest lands but at the same time it was lacking substantive standards
to guide decision making  (Applegate 1978, p. 149).
Logging on national forests increased from 2.5 billion board feet in 1946 to 12 billion
board feet annually by the mid sixties (Forest Ecosystem Management Team 1993 p. II-48).
Consequently, public pressure for timber regulation arose again as an issue when both Congress
and the public became increasingly concerned over the practice of clear cutting. Clear cutting
was scientifically validated as a tool to achieve both maximum harvest volume and ease of
replanting. As a practice, it was specifically tied to the vision of the forest as present and future
commodity. The public concern was indicative that other values were competing for room in the
rational vision of the forest. In 1970, Professor Arnold Bolle issued a report at the request of
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Senator Metcalf of Montana that was highly critical of the Forest Service’s emphasis on timber
production in the Bitterroot National Forest at the expense of its multiple use mandate. A year
earlier, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted which required the federal
government to “identify and develop methods and procedures…which will insure that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decision-making along with economic and technical considerations”  (Sec. 102 [42 USC §
4332]). NEPA called for an integrated approach to agency decisions and required environmental
impact statements on particular proposed agency actions (Porteous 1996). The Act also helped to
facilitate public challenges to ecologically unsound management practices. NEPA paved the way
for the Forest and Rangeland Renewal Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 which mandated a
comprehensive planning process for national forests and grazing lands on a nationwide basis.
Shortly after RPA’s passage, litigation involving the Monongahela National Forest in West
Virginia led the Fourth Circuit Court to determine that the Organic Act prohibited clear cutting
in national forests (Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 4th Circuit, 1975). Congress
responded to that decision by enacting the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) in 1976
(Wilkinson and Anderson 1987 p. 155).
The National Forest Management Act
NFMA was the result of the public debate that was reestablishing the assumptions
that govern the rationality of forest planning and in doing so was enlarging the vision of the
forest and that vision’s focus on the forest as revenue instrument. It was the effort of modern
social planning to straddle the market and social rationally that Friedman described. NFMA
centralizes focus on policy and program direction and amends portions of RPA. Its substantive
provisions include maintaining biological diversity, preserving land productivity, determining
suitable lands for timber harvest, and imposing limits on even aged management (Sedjo 1983;
Weis 1997). As a policy tool, NFMA mandated that programs and actions be formed with
national objectives using locally derived data as opposed to the prior planning that was done
locally and not comprehensively tied to a national vision or standard other than the forest as
commodity. This procedural approach provides the framework for national forest planning by
requiring the development of forest plans for all units of the National Forest System.
The regulations that were in effect until November 2000 were proposed in the NFMA
in 1979, and revised and approved in final form in 1982. They resulted in three subnational
planning and decision-making levels, the region level which consists of a number of national
forest units, the forest level consisting of each national forest, and the project level, which exists
on a forest district level. Each planning level is considered a NEPA action because it makes
decisions guiding the commitments of land, resources, and money and thus has an
Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) associated with it.
NFMA specifically required that planning  “form one integrated plan for each unit of the
National Forest System” (NFMA 1976. 16 U.S.C. 1600 Sec. 6(f) 1).
Practices and Consequences under NFMA
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The 1982 planning process has ten steps, to be followed in order, because they mirror
the process requirements for developing an EIS. The initial steps identify public issues and
management concerns, define planning criteria, and develop assessments of the current
conditions specific to its level. This assessment is called the “analysis of the management
situation,” and it includes demand-and-supply conditions for resource commodities as well as
their production potentials [16 U.S. C. 1604 Sec. 219.12 (e)].  To date, these analyses are
production-oriented, calling for benchmark analysis of the minimum and maximum physical and
biological production capabilities of significant goods and services, along with their associated
costs and benefits. These analyses are monetary benchmarks that maximize present net value of
commodity resources, estimate current production of these goods and services, and develop
projections of demand  (16 U.S. C. 1604 Sec. 219.12 1-5). Although the regulations require
protection of soil and water resources as well as assurance that viable wildlife populations will
persist across their usual range, these aspects are usually considered only after meeting timber-
harvest targets in most plans (Committee of Scientists (COS) 1999 p. 93). Additionally, although
RPA expected that “the new knowledge derived from coordinated public and private research
programs will promote a sound technical and ecological base for effective management, use and
protection of the Nation’s renewable resources” [RPA Sec. 2(4)], the 1982 regulations reflect the
vision of the forest as instrument of commodity production. Consequently, the information
developed for and used in forest planning does not sufficiently address the ecological and
sustainability issues of increasing concern to scientists and the public. The information also
invariably leads to underestimated or downplayed environmental effects of commodity
production in EIS analyses (COS 1999 pp. 91-95).
The political debates that were successful in enlarging the vision of the forest to
include more than commodity values made their way into law, but the rationality that governs
forest use is still tied to the simplified focus of market forces. The results of these contradictions,
the simultaneous legal requirements for market rationality and its emphasis on the forest as
revenue instrument, and social rationality and its public demand for more official recognition of
other forms of knowing the forest eventually led to the judicially ordered bans that almost
completely halted logging in the Northwest during the early 1990s.
The assumptions of the rational planning model are well suited to market rationally
given its emphasis on quantifiable data. In this case, they were equally well suited as a means for
social planning to achieve its goals of enlarging the vision of the forest. The successful legal
challenges to the maximization of timber harvest at the expense of species habitat that led to the
logging bans were based on measurable data that were aligned with what I consider to be the
actual goals of social planning in this instance; that of elevating the as-of-yet scientifically
unknown ecological processes and qualities to the same status as revenue production. This is the
actual arena of this public debate.
Committee of Scientists Report and Proposed Forest Rule Changes
In December 1997, the U. S. Secretary of Agriculture convened the Committee of
Scientists (COS), to take part in this debate. The Committee’s charter empowered them to “make
recommendations, provide technical advice and provide material for the Forest Service to
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incorporate into the revised planning regulations” (COS 1999. p.13). Their final report was
issued March 15, 1999. Public comment extended to June 2000. Proposed rules changes were
published in August 2000. Final Rules were adopted and published in November 2000.
Although not all of the Committee’s recommendations made it into the final rules, I
want to briefly review them as an example of how differing rationalities compete with each other
in the organization of social planning. The Committee did managed to bring the public concern
with enlarging the vision of the forest to a further point in the official conversation. The effect of
the COS Report was to elevate the as-of-yet scientifically unknown ecological processes and
qualities noted earlier to a status equal to that of revenue production. The Committee did this
through its use of the concept of sustainability (Mann & Plummer 1999).  The COS Report
considers sustainability as that whose definition has been evolving thorough the past one
hundred years of federal forestry management. The Committee maintains that this evolution has
passed through the application of sustaining commodity outputs to sustaining ecological systems.
They state that they operate under the assumption that ecological sustainability is the foundation
to all other definitions (COS 1999 pp. xiv - xvi).
These assertions became the assumptions that bounded the rationality of the
Committee’s report. They are in fact, part of the final rules.  The amended Section 219.2
Principles, reads in part:
 (a) The first priority for planning to guide management of the National Forest System
is to maintain or restore ecological sustainability of  national forests and grasslands to
provide for a wide variety of uses, values, products, and services. The benefits sought
from these lands depend upon  long-term ecological sustainability. Considering
increased human uses, it is essential that uses of today do not impair the functioning of
ecological processes and the ability of these natural resources to contribute to
sustainability in the future. (1) Planning provides the guidance for maintaining or
restoring the diversity of plant and animal communities and the productive capacity of
ecological systems, the core elements of ecological sustainability.(2) Planning is based
on science and other knowledge, including the use of scientifically based strategies for
sustainability and benefits from independent scientific peer review.
Section 219.2 of the final rules is devoted to the requirements of ecological sustainability and
requires evaluations of this sustainability in terms of ecosystem diversity, species diversity, and
soil and air resources.
These additions to the vision of the forest and its governing rationality did not meet
without opposition. Senator Larry Craig of Idaho initiated a General Accounting Service review
of the draft of the final rules. The October 25, 2000 edition of The Oregonian reported that the
GAO audit found that the new rules “overstep the law”. Senator Craig was quoted in the same
article as saying that the new rules were a  “futile and costly attempt to set unreachable
environmental goals.”
One part of the Committee’s report did not survive in the final rules, but I want to note
it because it introduces the notion of planning in the light of ambivalence that I want to examine
in the last section. In the Committee’s report the sustainability of ecological processes is the
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foundation of economic and social sustainability. Acknowledging that implementation of
sustainability into planning models is not a precise process, the Committee outlined seven
features of ecological systems that it recommended planning models should acknowledge. These
features act as principles to guide thirteen areas of policy concern.
•  Acknowledge the Dynamic Nature of Ecological Systems
•  Acknowledge the Significance of Natural Process
•  Acknowledge Uncertainty and Inherent Variability of Ecological Systems
•  Acknowledge Cumulative effects
•  Preserve Options
•  Conserve Habitat for Native Species and Productivity of Ecological Systems
•  Reduce Uncertainty Through Adaptive Management and Continuous Learning.
(COS 1999, pp. xvii - xx).
The reasons that these features should be integrated into planning assumptions are not
only due to the emergence of ecosystem management as the chosen management paradigm for
the National Forests and Grasslands. These features are not only a realistic acknowledgement of
the contingency of our knowledge concerning ecological systems, but they are also an
acknowledgement of the public creation of governing rationalities through debate. The
Committee’s report cites what they call recent social trends as hampering the planning process
envisioned by NFMA. According to the committee these include:
(1) the national public divisions over how best to manage the national forests,
(2) the emergence of wildlife and resource protection as a major goal of national
environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act,
(3) the public interest in becoming increasingly involved in sharing stewardship
responsibilities and having input into management decisions,
(4) the multitude of federal, state and local jurisdictions that have promulgated
regulations concerning the environment,
(5) the individual program-based budget structure that Congress and the Forest Service
continue to operate under which undermines the ability to implement balanced plans
(Report, 1999, p. 3).
The Committee contends that these developments do not fit the planning structure as
formulated under NFMA. In order to begin to integrate these developments, these debates, into
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planning models, the Committee recommends building upon the requirements of maintaining
species diversity and ecological productivity mandated by NFMA (NFMA Sec. 6 [3] [A], [B]),
and integrating with them the requirements that current understanding of the elements of
ecological sustainability demand. By integrating these elements and establishing ways by which
they can be measured, it can be determined when the objectives of sustainability have been
attained, and these concepts can then be incorporated into planning decisions.
Alternatives to the Rational Model: Planning in the Light of Ambivalence
Do we have alternatives to the rational model in planning, or are we limited to
expanding its evaluative criteria? Does the emphasis on correct ways of achieving goals preclude
those unmeasurable qualities that portions of the public want to include in the rational model’s
vision of the world? Are the concepts of sustainability that the Committee recommends
amenable to the constraints of the rational model?
Scott’s description of how the simplification of knowledge is essential to
understanding the more complex realities we are confronted with, so as to be able to act - can
also be viewed as that wall of certainty we create to protect ourselves from ambivalence.
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman defines ambivalence as a language specific disorder; the
possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category is a failure of the naming
or classifying function that language is meant to perform. He describes the main symptom of this
disorder as the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable to read a situation properly, or to
choose between alternative actions (Bauman 1991).
Certainty as an element of the rational model is essential. We may be lacking in data,
or in competent data, and we may be lacking in full knowledge of the consequences of our
actions, but we must proceed with some level of certainty or our plans may wither from lack of
support. My question is this: are we able to build uncertainty, or rather the discomfort of
ambivalence into our planning models and yet still proceed with the necessary level of certainty?
The seven features of ecological systems that the Committee recommended planning
models should acknowledge and policies should be guided by all highlight uncertainty in some
way. There is no language in the final forest rules which refers to these features as guiding
principles, but just noting a few of them may give an indication of how planning in the light of
ambivalence might proceed.  
Acknowledge the Dynamic Nature of Ecological Systems
The understanding of natural systems that ecologists bring to their science has
evolved from considering nature as existing in a steady state or balance to one that recognizes its
inherently dynamic interdependence, which is in effect, a dynamic of nonequilibrium. If we also
recognize that the influence of unanticipated disturbances are factors in the maintenance of
systems, then the models of planning actions to sustain systems becomes tentative at best.
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Acknowledge the Significance of Natural Processes
The Committee cites the lack of appreciation of natural processes in past forest
planning. Timber harvests were guided by NFMA mandates of “maximum sustained yield”
which generally assumed that disturbances, especially fire and insect infestation could and would
be suppressed (COS pp. 24-26). These disturbances could therefore be ignored in planning
models. When disturbances were successful, the mandated timber harvest levels were under-
achieved. When projects of disturbance suppression were successful, they often created different
problems.
Acknowledge Uncertainty and Inherent Variability of Ecological Systems
Uncertainty in this context refers to the “scientific uncertainty that arises from
incomplete understanding of how ecological systems work or insufficient information to
determine the relationships between processes” (COS 1999 p. 25). Uncertainty also refers to
incomplete knowledge of the impacts of planning decisions. Variability refers to the different
ways similar processes may work under differing thresholds of adaptation in different locations
or spatial scales. “Analysis of management alternatives must consider the lack of complete
understanding of relationships within ecological systems [and] confidence limits on projections
into the future” (COS 1999 p. 25).  In contrast, timber harvests under NFMA were presented as a
specific value and not a range of values. The factor of uncertainty was not a factor at all and
consequently unrealistic expectations were generated for Congress and the public (Forest
Ecosystem Management Team, 1993, pp. IV- 3-38).
Acknowledge Cumulative Effects
Cumulative effects were defined in administrative rules for NEPA regulations as “the
impact on the environment resulting from the incremental impact of the action when added to
other past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions regardless of what agency or person
undertakes such actions” (Federal Register 43 (230) 55978-56007, Nov. 29, 1978). This
definition of cumulative effects assumes that an effect from a management action can be
identified as an addition of effects. An ecological understanding recognizes multiple responses to
changes in ecological systems. Since natural disturbances are integral to ecological systems, the
difficulty in integrating unpredictable disturbances into studies of cumulative effects is daunting.
Similarly, many types of cumulative effects from project actions may not become apparent until
after a single disturbance or a single action makes them evident. Floods may expose the
cumulative effects of overgrazing in riparian areas. Fire may expose the cumulative effects of
fire suppression. Storms may expose the cumulative effects of consistent road building.
Cumulative effects on one spatial level may have consequences on other levels. Existing
management models in NFMA do not specifically mention cumulative effects, or methods of
cumulative effect analyses (COS 1999, p. 26).
Preserve Options
Options are to be preserved precisely because of the incomplete nature of our
knowledge. In the Committee’s language, preserving options “assumes that an acceptable range
of choices will be available to address the environmental problems confronting future human
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generations…This philosophy is, perhaps, best encapsulated by focusing first on what we leave
before focusing on what we take from ecological systems” (COS 1999 pp. 25-26).
These recommendations do not abandon the rational planning model even in light of
their emphasis on uncertainty, variability, lack of complete understanding, and limits to
confidence. Rather, the Committee proceeds certain that a certain order can be restored to
understanding. An orderly world is a world in which ‘one knows how to go on’, or in which one
knows how to calculate the probability of an event. The way that the Committee advises us to go
on with forestry planning is as an experiment. Their advice is get on with a model of adaptive
management, that is, management actions as experiments in order to “reduce uncertainty through
continuous learning”
This emphasis on adaptive management, or management not as plans, but as
contingent, working notebooks is a new dimension to the rational model. It bespeaks a certain
modestly regarding our self-confidence in scientific knowledge, and in our ability to know
something as the truth.
There is another way that we are able to know how to go on, and that is through
talking to each other. The discomfort of ambivalence is a social as well as a personal
phenomenon. I have not mentioned collaborative planing experiments in this essay, but the
possibilities that they hold for mutual understanding and the continued evolution of the
rationalities that govern our lives are manifold. If Friedmann is right in assessing a plurality of
rational systems, then an understanding of the assumptions beneath these systems should allow
rational people to engage in conversation. And conversations are worthwhile when they change
the conversationalists.
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